In this paper we study a time-inconsistent consumption-investment problem with random endowments in a possibly incomplete market under general discount functions. We provide a necessary condition and a verification theorem for an open-loop equilibrium consumption-investment pair in terms of a coupled forward-backward stochastic differential equation. Moreover, we prove the uniqueness of the open-loop equilibrium pair by showing that the original time-inconsistent problem is equivalent to an associated time-consistent one.
Introduction
In this paper, we investigate a time-inconsistent consumption-investment problem in an incomplete market under general discount functions. In the recent years, time-inconsistent control problems have received remarkable attentions in control theory, mathematical finance and Economics. Time-inconsistency for a dynamic control problem means that the so-called Bellman's principle of optimality does not hold. In other words, a restriction of an optimal control for a specific initial pair on a later time interval might not be optimal for that corresponding initial pair. Such a situation occurs for example in dynamic mean-variance control problems and in utility maximization problems for consumption-investment strategies under non-exponential discounting. In this paper we focus on the later problem. In classical consumption-investment problems under discounted utility, the discount function which represents the time-preference of an investor is assumed to be exponential. This assumption implies that the discount rate is constant over time and provides the possibility to compare outcomes occurring at different times by discounting future utility at a constant rate. The compatibility of discounted utility at different times leads to time-consistency of the problem, and hence we can use the classical dynamic programming approaches and the analytical tools of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations to obtain the optimal strategy together with the value function. However, results from experimental studies indicate that discount rates for near future are much lower than discount rates for the time further away in future, that contradict the assumption of exponential discounting; see, e.g., Ainslie [1] . Therefore, it is important to investigate consumption-investment problems under non-exponential discounting. Unfortunately, in the case of non-exponential discounting, we cannot compare discounted utility at different times and hence the problem becomes time-inconsistent. In order to handle that problem in a time-consisting way, we must introduce another concept of solutions instead of an optimal control.
In the literatures of time-inconsistent control problems, several concepts of time-consistent solutions have been introduced and investigated. The main approaches to handle timeinconsistent control problems are to seek for, instead of optimal controls, time-consistent equilibrium controls, which are within a game theoretic framework. Björk, Khapko and Murgoci [4] introduced a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy in a Markovian setting and derived an extended HJB equation. Yong [17] considered a closed-loop equilibrium strategy in a multi-players differential game framework with a hierarchical structure and derived the so-called equilibrium HJB equation. These two methods to treat time-inconsistent control problems are extensions of the classical dynamic programming approaches. In contrast, Hu, Jin and Zhou [12, 13] defined an open-loop equilibrium control for a time-inconsistent linear-quadratic stochastic control problem and investigated a dynamic mean-variance control problem. They used a duality method in the spirit of the classical maximum principle and characterized an open-loop equilibrium control by a "flow" of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs for short), which is a coupled system consisting of a single stochastic differential equation (SDE) and a continuum of backward SDEs (BSDEs) defined on different time intervals. The solvability of a flow of FBSDEs remains a challenging open problem except for some special cases; see Hamaguchi [9] for small-time solvability of a flow of FBSDEs with Lipschitz continuous coefficients. In order to handle time-inconsistent consumption-investment problems in a continuous-time model, Ekeland and Pirvu [6] were the first to provide a precise definition of the equilibrium concept within a class of closedloop strategies in a Markovian model. They characterized the equilibrium policy through the solution of a flow of BSDEs, and they showed, with a special form of the discount function, this flow of BSDEs has a solution. Zhao, Shen and Wei [19] studied a time-inconsistent consumption-investment problem in a non-Markovian model with the logarithmic utility function and a general (Lipschitz continuous) discount function. They adopted the multiplayers differential game approach introduced by [17] and obtained a time-consistent strategy. Zhao, Wang and Wei [20] also adopted the multi-players differential game approach to investigate a time-inconsistent consumption-investment-reinsurance problem for an insurer with the exponential utility function and a general discount function (with some structural assumptions). Their model is non-Markov, while the interest rate is assumed to be deterministic. In contrast, within the class of open-loop controls, Alia et al. [3] studied a time-inconsistent consumption-investment problem under a general utility function (but with some very strong assumptions) and a general (Lipschitz continuous) discount function. They derived, by using the same duality method as [12, 13] , a flow of FBSDEs which characterizes the open-loop equilibrium consumption-investment pair. They assumed that the market is complete and the interest rate is deterministic. Note that their assumptions imposed on the utility function is too strong to apply to the exponential utility case; see Remark 2.3 for some comments on their results. In fact, most literatures assume that the interest rate is deterministic, or that the utility function has a specific form or satisfies some strong assumptions. It is also worth mentioning that, compared to existence of an equilibrium control, there are only a few results about uniqueness of the equilibrium control. For more details about time-inconsistent stochastic control problems, see Yan and Yong [16] and its references.
The aim of this paper is to investigate an open-loop equilibrium strategy pair of a timeinconsistent consumption-investment problem under general utility functions and general discount functions. The novelties of this paper are as follows:
(i) The market is possibly incomplete and the interest rate is allowed to be a stochastic process. Moreover, the investor is assumed to be endowed with a random income and a random terminal lump-sum payment.
(ii) We provide a necessary condition (Theorem 3.1) and a verification theorem (Theorem 4.1) for an open-loop equilibrium pair. Their conditions are related to the solvability of the corresponding fully coupled FBSDE, which is more tractable than a flow of FBSDEs appearing in [6, 3] .
(iii) By using the above results, we prove that finding an open-loop equilibrium pair of the time-inconsistent consumption-investment problem is equivalent to finding an optimal pair of a time-consistent one (Theorem 5.3).
(iv) As a consequence, we get uniqueness of an open-loop equilibrium pair satisfying suitable integrability conditions.
Let us remark on the result (iii). Recently, Alia [2] studied a time-inconsistent control problem for a jump diffusion model under a general discount function and constructed an equivalent time-consistent control problem. He firstly proved the equivalence of two problems and then characterized an open-loop equilibrium control of the original time-inconsistent problem by solving the associated time-consistent one. However, in his model all the coefficients are assumed to be deterministic and some strong conditions are imposed. Since our model specified below does not satisfy these conditions, we cannot use his result directly. In contrast to the above mentioned paper, we firstly characterize an open-loop equilibrium pair and then, as a consequence, we get the associated time-consistent problem. Our method to prove the main theorems (Theorems 3.1, 4.1) are inspired by Horst et al. [10] . They studied a timeconsistent utility maximization problem for the terminal wealth (without consumption) in an incomplete market with a general utility function and characterized an optimal control by a fully coupled FBSDE, which is different from that appearing in the classical duality method.
The key observation of their method is to derive the dynamics of the density process of an equivalent martingale measure under which the optimal wealth process becomes a true martingale. This observation is called the martingale optimality principle, which goes back to Hu, Imkeller and Müller [11] who treated some particular utility functions, that is, exponential, logarithmic and power utility functions. See also Cheridito and Hu [5] for the martingale optimality principle for (time-consistent) consumption-investment problems under non-convex constraints, where the above three types of utility functions and the exponential discount function were treated. In this paper, we consider general utility functions defined on the whole real line and general discount functions. Unfortunately, due to the time-inconsistency, the martingale optimality principle does not make sense in our problem. Our idea to treat a time-inconsistent consumption-investment problem is, loosely speaking, to combine the technique of [10] and the duality method for time-inconsistent control problems. In such a way we obtain a characterization of an open-loop equilibrium pair by an FBSDE, which has more information about the structure of an open-loop equilibrium pair than the characterization by the duality method; see Remark 3.7. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce our financial market model. In Section 3 we provide a necessary condition for an open-loop equilibrium pair in terms of an FBSDE. As a converse result, in Section 4 we derive a verification theorem, that is, we show that a solution of the FBSDE appearing in the necessary condition allows to construct an open-loop equilibrium pair. By using these results, in Section 5, we relate our time-inconsistent problem to a time-consistent one, and show the uniqueness of an open-loop equilibrium pair of the original time-inconsistent problem.
The model
Let T > 0 be a finite time horizon and W = (W t ) t∈[0,T ] be a d-dimensional Brownian motion on a complete probability space (Ω, F , P). F = (F t ) t∈[0,T ] denotes the P-augmentation of the filtration generated by W . Denote by E t [·] the conditional expectation given F t for each t ∈ [0, T ). 1l A denotes the indicator function for a set A, and Leb denotes the Lebesgue measure on R. For t ∈ [0, T ], p, q ≥ 1 and H = R, R d , define
We consider a financial market consisting of a riskless asset S 0 and d risky assetsS i , i = 1, . . . , d. The prices of these assets follow the dynamics
where r and b i , i = 1, . . . , d, are R-valued predictable processes. We assume that the interest rate process r and the excess rate of return vector process θ := (b 1 − r, . . . , b d − r) ⊤ are bounded. It is well-known that in this market model arbitrage opportunities are excluded; see the textbook [14] . Consider a small investor receiving an income at a predictable rate e and an F T -measurable lump-sum payment E at time T who can consume at intermediate times and invest in the financial market. Let d 1 ∈ {1, . . . , d} and assume that the investor can invest in the riskless asset S 0 and the risky assetsS 1 , . . . ,S d 1 , while the assetsS d 1 +1 , . . . ,S d cannot be invested into. Note that if d 1 < d (resp. d 1 = d) then the market is incomplete (resp. complete). Define W H :
Here, the notation H refers to "hedgeable" and O to "orthogonal". (We borrowed these notations from [10] .) Hereafter, for each x = (x 1 , . . . , x d ) ⊤ ∈ R d , we use the notations
If the investor whose initial wealth at time t ∈ [0, T ) is x t ∈ R consumes at a predictable rate c and invests according to an R d -valued predictable trading strategy π = (π 1 , . . . , π d 1 , 0, . . . , 0) ⊤ , where π i s is the amount of money invested in stock i at time s, then his/her wealth X (c,π) = X (c,π,t,xt) evolves as
s., then SDE (2.1) has a unique continuous solution X (c,π) . Suppose that the investor seeks for a pair (c, π) that maximizes the reward functional
over all admissible strategy pairs, where U 1 , U 2 are utility functions for instantaneous consumptions and the terminal wealth respectively, and λ 1 , λ 2 are discount functions which represent time-preferences of the investor. The standing assumptions are summarized as follows.
Assumption. (i) r is an R-valued bounded predictable process and θ is an R d -valued bounded predictable process.
(ii) e is an R-valued predictable process such that T 0 |e s | ds < ∞ a.s., and E is an R-valued F T -measurable random variable.
(iii) U 1 , U 2 : R → R are three times differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave and satisfy the Inada condition; For i = 1, 2,
(v) λ 2 : [0, T ] → R + is continuous and strictly positive.
In this paper we consider general utility functions (defined on the whole real line) and general discount functions satisfying the above standing assumptions. Some possible examples of discount functions are as follows:
• Exponential discounting:
with some constant δ ≥ 0;
• Heterogeneous discounting:
with some constants δ 1 , δ 2 ≥ 0 such that δ 1 = δ 2 ;
• Convex combination of two exponential discounting:
with some constants α ∈ (0, 1) and δ 1 , δ 2 > 0 such that δ 1 = δ 2 ;
• Quasi-exponential discounting:
with some constants α, δ > 0;
• Hyperbolic discounting:
with some (possibly different) constants δ 1 , δ 2 > 0.
In the above examples λ 1 and λ 2 can be seen as functions of s − t and T − t respectively. More generally, we may consider the following type of discount functions:
• Exponential discounting with reference-time-dependent discount rates:
Note that the discount functions of the form as in the last example cannot be written as functions of s−t or T −t, therefore they are beyond the class of discount functions considered in the literatures [6, 19, 20, 3] .
It is well-known that if λ 1 , λ 2 are exponential discount functions, then the maximization problem for reward functional (2.2) is time-consistent. However, if we assume that λ 1 , λ 2 are non-exponential discount functions, it is time-inconsistent in general; see Yong [17] . Instead of finding a global optimal pair (which does not exist), we seek for an open-loop equilibrium pair (c * , π * ). To define an open-loop equilibrium pair, we impose the following condition on a consumption-investment pair (c, π). Let x ∈ R be a given initial wealth.
(H0) x c is an R-valued predictable process, π is an R d -valued predictable process such that π = (π 1 , . . . , π d 1 , 0, . . . , 0) ⊤ , and it holds that
where X (c,π) := X (c,π,0,x) .
Denote by Π x 0 the set of pairs (c, π) satisfying (H0) x . Moreover, we introduce the set of perturbations; For each t ∈ [0, T ), define
Remark 2.2. The above definition of an ope-loop equilibrium pair is inspired by [12, 13] . An open-loop equilibrium pair is a time-consistent consumption-investment strategy pair satisfying a kind of local optimality condition. Note that we consider only bounded perturbations (κ, η) ∈ χ t of a pair (c * , π * ) ∈ Π x 0 . Remark 2.3. If the interest rate process r is deterministic, d 1 = d (i.e. the market is complete), (e, E) = (0, 0) (i.e. without endowments), U
are bounded, and λ 1 , λ 2 are of the forms λ 1 (t, s) = λ(s − t) and λ 2 (t) = λ(T − t) for some Lipschitz continuous function λ, then our model becomes (essentially) the same one as in Alia et al. [3] . They suggested that in this setting an open-loop equilibrium control is characterized by a flow of FBSDEs. However, their arguments are incomplete because of the following reasons:
(i) Integrability conditions on (c * , π * ) are not discussed sufficiently. They assumed admissible consumption processes are bounded but the resulting equilibrium consumption process is not bounded.
(ii) The well-definedness of the term "lim ǫ↓0
A(s; t) ds]" in their notation is not clear and it should be checked carefully.
(iii) The assumption that U
are bounded is too strong to apply to some important problems in mathematical finance. For example, the exponential utility function does not satisfy this assumption. Hence their application to such a special utility function is questionable.
The aim of this paper is to characterize an open-loop equilibrium pair by an FBSDE. We must treat the integrability conditions and the limit operations carefully to overcome the technical difficulties mentioned above. To do so, let us introduce further conditions of consumption-investment pairs. Let x ∈ R and p > 1.
(H1) x,p (c, π) satisfies (H0) x and
(H2) x,p (c, π) satisfies (H1) x,p . Moreover, there exists a constant q > 1 such that:
Here we used the notations
(2.5)
For i = 1, 2, we denote by Π x,p i the set of (c, π) satisfying (Hi) x,p . Clearly, it holds that 
(ii) There exists a constant K > 0 such that
Then Π x,p 1 = Π x,p 2 for any x ∈ R and p > 1.
Proof. Note that, for i = 1, 2, U ′ i is positive and decreasing. Hence for any x ∈ R and δ ≥ 0, it holds that
Moreover, The assumption (ii) of this lemma yields that
1 with x ∈ R and p > 1. Then for any δ ≥ 0 we get
Moreover, we can easily show that, for any t ∈ [0, T ) and (κ, η) ∈ χ t , it holds that sup ǫ∈(0,T −t) E[exp(c|ξ t,ǫ T |)] < ∞ for any c > 0. Therefore, Hölder's inequality yields that, for any q ∈ (1, p),
implying that the family of random variables {M 2 (X (c,π) T + E; |ξ t,ǫ T |) q } ǫ∈(0,T −t) is uniformly integrable for any q ∈ (1, p). Hence (c, π) ∈ Π x,p 2 and this completes the proof. Remark 2.5. Clearly exponential utility functions of the form U(x) = − exp(−γx) with some constant γ > 0 satisfy the assumptions of Lemma 2.4. More generally, the following class of utility functions, which was introduced by Fromm and Imkeller [8] , also satisfies the assumptions of Lemma 2.4: Utility functions U : R → R of the form
where in the first inequality we used the convexity of κ. Therefore the second assumption of Lemma 2.4 is also satisfied.
A necessary condition for an equilibrium pair
In this section, we provide a necessary condition for an open-loop equilibrium pair.
Theorem 3.1. Fix an initial wealth x ∈ R and let (c * , π * ) ∈ Π x,p 2 for some p > 1. If (c * , π * ) is an open-loop equilibrium pair, then there exists a pair (Y, Z) such that:
(ii) (Y, Z) satisfies the following BSDE:
where the generator f * : (iii) It holds that
In particular, the triplet (X, Y, Z) := (X * , Y, Z) satisfies the following coupled FBSDE:
To prove Theorem 3.1, let us show several lemmas. We fix x ∈ R and p > 1.
Lemma 3.2. For any (c * , π * ) ∈ Π x,p 1 , there exists a pair (Y, Z) satisfying the conditions (i) and (ii) in Theorem 3.1 such that, for any t ∈ [0, T ), (κ, η) ∈ χ t and ǫ ∈ (0, T − t), it holds that, a.s.,
Proof. Let (c * , π * ) ∈ Π x,p 1 and fix t ∈ [0, T ), (κ, η) ∈ χ t and ǫ ∈ (0, T − t). Define X t,ǫ := X (c t,ǫ ,π t,ǫ ,t,X * t ) and ξ t,ǫ := X t,ǫ − X * . Then ξ t,ǫ is the solution of SDE (2.5). Noting that U ′′ 1 and U ′′ 2 are negative, we see that
(3.6)
Then α t = E t e − T t rs ds U ′ 2 (X * T + E) a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ]; see El Karoui et al. [7] . In particular, α t is positive and hence
and hence
Then clearly Z is an R d -valued predictable process satisfying T 0 |Z s | 2 ds < ∞ a.s. Moreover, from the above equation, we see that (Y, Z) satisfies BSDE (3.1). Hence, (Y, Z) satisfies the conditions (i) and (ii) in Theorem 3.1. It remains to prove that the equality (3.4) holds. By the definitions of α and Y , using Itô's formula for the process (α s ξ t,ǫ s ) s∈[t+ǫ,T ] , we see that
Noting that
we can easily show that
Consequently, we get
Therefore, by (3.5) and (3.7), we obtain the equality (3.4) .
We want to calculate the limit of the right hand side of (3.4) when ǫ tends to zero. To do so, we use the following lemma which was proved by Wang [15] . 
Proof. Note that, for any t ∈ [0, T ) and ǫ ∈ (0, T − t), it holds that
Since λ 1 is continuous and λ 1 (t, t) = 1, we see that lim ǫ↓0 max t≤s≤t+ǫ |λ 1 (t, s) − 1| = 0 for any t ∈ [0, T ). Moreover, since E[U ′ 1 (c * )] ∈ L p (0, T ; R), by the Lebesgue differentiation theorem, there exists a measurable setẼ 1 ⊂ [0, T ) with Leb([0, T ] \Ẽ 1 ) = 0 such that, for any t ∈Ẽ 1 , the term 1
Hence, for such t, there exists a sequence {ǫ t n } n∈N ⊂ (0, T − t) such that lim n→∞ ǫ t n = 0 and
, θ H is predictable and bounded, and U ′′ 2 (X * + Y )(π * + Z H ) ∈ L p F (Ω; L 2 (0, T ; R d )), Lemma 3.3 yields that there exists a measurable set E 1 ⊂Ẽ 1 with Leb([0, T ] \ E 1 ) = 0 such that, for any t ∈ E 1 , there exists a subsequence of {ǫ t n } n∈N which we also denote by {ǫ t n } n∈N such that, a.s.,
and
Hence the assertions of Lemma 3.4 follow.
Lemma 3.5. Let (c * , π * ) ∈ Π x,p 1 , (Y, Z), E 1 and {ǫ t n } n∈N , t ∈ E 1 , be the ones in Lemma 3.4. Fix an arbitrary δ > 0. If moreover (c * , π * ) ∈ Π x,p 2 , then there exists a measurable set E 2 ⊂ E 1 with Leb([0, T ] \ E 2 ) = 0 such that, for any t ∈ E 2 and any (κ, η) ∈ χ t with |κ| ≤ δ, there exists a subsequence of {ǫ t n } n∈N which we also denote by {ǫ t n } n∈N satisfying, a.s., lim sup
where C > 0 is a constant which depends only on q, T, λ 1 ∞ , λ 2 ∞ , r ∞ and θ H ∞ , and q is a constant satisfying the assertions in (H2) x,p .
Proof. Assume that (c * , π * ) ∈ Π x,p 2 and let q > 1 be a constant satisfying the assertions in (H2) x,p . Fix an arbitrary δ > 0. Note that, for any t ∈ [0, T ), (κ, η) ∈ χ t with |κ| ≤ δ and ǫ ∈ (0, T − t), it holds that
T 2 a.s., (3.8) where M i , i = 1, 2, are defined by (2.4). Since M 1 (c * ; δ) ∈ L q F (0, T ; R), by Lemma 3.3, there exists a measurable subset E 2 ⊂ E 1 with Leb([0, T ] \ E 2 ) = 0 such that, for any t ∈ E 2 , there exists a subsequence of {ǫ t n } n∈N which we also denote by {ǫ t n } n∈N such that
Fix t ∈ E 2 and let (κ, η) ∈ χ t with |κ| ≤ δ. Denote |ξ t,ǫ t n ,κ,η | by ξ n for each n ∈ N. Then it can be easily shown that
for any n ∈ N and any γ > 1, where C γ > 0 is a constant which depends only on γ, T, r ∞ and θ H ∞ . Hence, by Hölder's inequality, we obtain
Note that by considering a subsequence of {ǫ t n } n∈N (which may depend on (κ, η)) we can assume without loss of generality that lim n→∞ ξ n = 0 a.s., and hence
Since the sequence {M 2 (X * T + E; ξ n ) q } n∈N is uniformly integrable by the condition (ii) in (H2) x,p , we obtain lim n→∞ E t M 2 (X * T + E; ξ n ) q = E t |U ′′ 2 (X * T + E)| q a.s. 
Dividing both sides of the above inequality by δ m and then letting m → ∞, we obtain
By the arguments in the proof of Lemma 3.2, we see that the pair of adapted processes (Y, Z) corresponding to (c * , π * ) ∈ Π x,p
is the unique adapted solution of BSDE (3.6) . Therefore, if (c * , π * ) ∈ Π x,p 2 is an open-loop equilibrium pair, then by the condition (3.2) we obtain This consequence generalizes the result obtained by Alia et al. [3] to an incomplete market setting. The random field (p, q) satisfies a "flow" of BSDEs (3.13) with the additional condition (3.14) imposed on the diagonal terms (p s s , q s s ). Note that the flow of BSDEs (3.13) is a system of adjoint equations parametrized by t ∈ [0, T ] in the spirit of the duality method for time-inconsistent stochastic control problems; see [12, 13, 3, 18, 16] . However, unlike FBSDE (3.3), we cannot obtain an equation of a closed form directly by the system consisting of (2.1), (3.13) and (3.14) , since the condition (3.14) does not give an expression for the investment process π * . Hence, in our problem, the necessary condition stated in Theorem 3.1 has more information for the structure of an open-loop equilibrium pair than the consequence obtained by the duality method.
A verification theorem
In Section 3, we proved that if there exists an open-loop equilibrium pair in the set Π x,p 2 , then FBSDE (3.3) has an adapted solution. In this section, we prove the inverse direction. In other words, we provide a verification theorem for an open-loop equilibrium pair. ) and
Then (c * , π * ) ∈ Π x,p 1 and it is an open-loop equilibrium pair for the initial wealth x with the corresponding wealth process X (c * ,π * ,0,x) = X.
Proof. Clearly the pair of predictable processes (c * , π * ) defined by (4.1) satisfies T 0 (|c * s | + |π * s | 2 ) ds < ∞ a.s. and π * = (π * ,1 , . . . , π * ,d 1 , 0, . . . , 0) ⊤ . The continuous process X satisfies SDE (2.1) with the initial value x at time zero and (c, π) = (c * , π * ). By the uniqueness of the continuous solution of SDE (2.1), we get X * := X (c * ,π * ,0,x) = X. Then by the assumption (ii) of this theorem we see that (c * , π * ) ∈ Π x 0 . Moreover, since
we see that (c * , π * ) ∈ Π x,p 1 . Now let us show that (c * , π * ) is an open-loop equilibrium pair. Fix arbitrary t ∈ [0, T ), (κ, η) ∈ χ t and ǫ ∈ (0, T − t). Define X t,ǫ := X (c t,ǫ ,π t,ǫ ,t,X * t ) and ξ t,ǫ := X t,ǫ − X * . Then ξ t,ǫ is the solution of SDE (2.5). Since U 1 and U 2 are concave, we have R(c t,ǫ , π t,ǫ ; t, X * t ) − R(c * , π * ; t, X * t ) ǫ
Define α := U ′ 2 (X + Y ). By the assumption, α is in L p F (Ω; C([0, T ]; R)). Moreover, by Itô's formula,
Thus, by letting β :
Since α ∈ L p F (Ω; C([0, T ]; R)) and r is bounded, by using the BDG inequality we can easily show that β ∈ L p F (Ω; L 2 (0, T ; R d )). Moreover, again by Itô's formula, we obtain
By the definition of (α, β), we see that αθ H + β H = 0. Moreover, noting that Consequently, we get
From this equality and the estimate (4.2) we obtain
Since λ 1 and λ 2 are continuous, noting that λ 1 (t, t) = 1, the second line of the above inequalities tends to zero as ǫ ↓ 0. Consequently, we obtain 
Therefore, by letting ρ :=
where E(·) denotes the stochastic exponent. The positive continuous semimartingale ρ can be seen as a pricing kernel or a state density price for the incomplete market consisting of the riskless asset and the tradable risky assets 1, . . . , d 1 ; see the textbook [14] .
An equivalent time-consistent problem
In this section, we investigate a relationship between an open-loop equilibrium pair of a time-inconsistent control problem and an optimal pair of a time-consistent problem. Define the sets of coefficients of the reward functional as follows: The reward functional R is determined by (λ 1 ,
We refer to the time-inconsistent consumption-investment problem with coefficients (λ 1 , λ 2 , U 1 , U 2 ) and an initial wealth x ∈ R as Problem (I) x λ 1 ,λ 2 ,U 1 ,U 2 . By Theorems 3.1, 4.1 and Remark 4.2, we easily obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 5.1. Suppose that a triplet (λ 2 , U 1 , U 2 ) ∈ Λ 2 × U × U is given. Fix an initial wealth x ∈ R and let (c * , π * ) ∈ Π x,p 2 for some p > 1. Then the following are equivalent:
is an open-loop equilibrium pair for Problem (I) x λ 1 ,λ 2 ,U 1 ,U 2 ;
(ii) For any λ 1 ∈ Λ 1 , (c * , π * ) is an open-loop equilibrium pair for Problem (I) x λ 1 ,λ 2 ,U 1 ,U 2 .
Next, we introduce a time-consistent consumption-investment problem which turns out to be equivalent to Problem (I) We refer to the above maximization problem as Problem (C) x,p λ 2 ,U 1 ,U 2 . We call a pair (c * , π * ) satisfying (5.1) an optimal pair. It is well known that Problem (C) x,p λ 2 ,U 1 ,U 2 is time-consistent. Indeed, the following lemma holds true.
Proof. Firstly, assume that (c * , π * ) is an optimal pair for Problem (C)
x,p/(p−1) λ 2 ,U 1 ,U 2 . Fix arbitrary t ∈ [0, T ), (κ, η) ∈ χ t and ǫ ∈ (0, T − t). We extend the pair (c t,ǫ , π t,ǫ ) to [0, T ] by defining (c t,ǫ s , π t,ǫ s ) := (c * s , π * s ) for s ∈ [0, t). Then X t,ǫ := X (c t,ǫ ,π t,ǫ ,t,X * t ) is also extended as X t,ǫ s = X * s = X (c t,ǫ ,π t,ǫ ,0,x) s for s ∈ [0, t). Note that
proving (c t,ǫ , π t,ǫ ) ∈ Π x 0 . Clearly (c t,ǫ , π t,ǫ ) ∈ L p/(p−1) F (Ω; L 1 (0, T ; R))×L p/(p−1) F (Ω; L 2 (0, T ; R d )) since (c * , π * ) ∈ Π x,p/(p−1) 3
. Hence, we have that (c t,ǫ , π t,ǫ ) ∈ Π x,p/(p−1) 3 . Since (c * , π * ) is an optimal pair for Problem (C)
x,p/(p−1) λ 2 ,U 1 ,U 2 , by Lemma 5.2, we obtain 0 ≥ R(c t,ǫ , π t,ǫ ; t, X * t ) − R(c * , π * ; t, X * t ) Clearlyλ 1 is in Λ 1 . Denote byR the reward functional corresponding to (λ 1 , λ 2 , U 1 , U 2 ). Then we getR(c t,ǫ , π t,ǫ ; t, X * t ) −R(c * , π * ; t, X * t ) ≤ 0 a.s., in particular, lim sup ǫ↓0R (c t,ǫ , π t,ǫ ; t, X * t ) −R(c * , π * ; t, X * t ) ǫ ≤ 0 a.s., Then by the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 4.1, we can show that (α, β) is in L p F (Ω; C([0, T ]; R)) × L p F (Ω; L 2 (0, T ; R d )) and satisfies BSDE (3.6). Now take an arbitrary (c, π) ∈ Π x,p/(p−1) 3 . Define (ĉ,π) := (c − c * , π − π * ) andξ := X (c,π,0,x) − X * . Thenξ satisfies the SDE dξ s = (r sξs +π s · θ H s −ĉ s ) ds +π s · dW H s , s ∈ [0, T ], ξ 0 = 0.
Since r and θ are bounded and (ĉ,π) ∈ L p/(p−1) F (Ω; L 1 (0, T ; R)) × L p/(p−1) F (Ω; L 2 (0, T ; R d )), it can be easily shown thatξ ∈ L p/(p−1) F (Ω; C([0, T ]; R)). By the concavity of U 1 and U 2 , we have R(c, π; x) − R(c * , π * ; x) ≤ E 
